SIPNOC 2019 SHAKEN STI Policy Administrator and Certificate Management


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SHAKEN Certificate Management Architecture



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Interface used during Session Setup


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Public Key Certificates


- SHAKEN uses existing widely deployed Public Key Infrastructure principals and techniques (X.509 Certificates) and secure tokens to securely carry telephone identities through the network:
 - Private keys are only visible to the Originating Service Provider
 - Public Keys are available along the call path
 - Public Key certificate:

- Allows terminating service provider to verify the authenticity of the telephone identity of calling party
- Includes a new OID including Service Provider Code (OCN)
- Leverages existing Issuing Distribution Point OID (DistributionPointName field) for indirect CRL model






Certificate Management Roles




STI-PA Role: Administration of STI-CAs










SHAKEN Trust Authority Model



- STI-PA maintains list of Trusted CAs on behalf of the relying parties in the PKI
- STI-PA serves as the Trust Anchor to the relying parties in the PKI
- Each STI-CA must support Certificate Policy (CP) as established by the STI-PA
- STI-PA reviews Certification Practice Statement (CPS) as provided by the STI-CAs to ensure compliance
- STI-PA also supports the distribution of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)

STI-Policy Administrator (STI-PA)



Trust Authority Role


- Supports unique requirements of managing PKI infrastructure for STI and Service Providers' interactions with the PKI
 - Serves as the Trust Authority for the PKI by maintaining a list of trusted STI-CAs
 - Serves as a Trust Anchor providing valid service providers with a unique token for authorization to get STI certificates

Certificate Issuance

- Serves no **direct** role in the issuance or validation of certificates:
 - Service Provider Code token mechanism used for authorization
 - Traditional PKI mechanisms for certification path validation are followed during the verification process:
 - STI-PA is NOT in the Certification Path

STI-Certification Authority (STI-CA)








STI-VS gets STI public key certificate used to sign the Identity header field from the STI-CR during the verification process

- No new functionality or interfaces required
- Follows existing procedures as defined in RFC 5280



SP-Key Management Server (SP-KMS)



PKI Model for SHAKEN



Model similar to inter-domain PKI*

- Each STI-CA serves as a root CA operating independently – no cross certificates
- STI-CAs must be approved by the STI-PA and follow Certificate Policy requirements defined by the STI-PA PMA
- STI-PA maintains a Trust List of approved CAs
- Allows each Service Provider to use an STI-CA that satisfies their business needs and meets established corporate security requirements

* see examples in RFC 5217

Use of the X.509 certificates follows standard practices:

- New extension (OID) defined for SHAKEN TNAuthList
- Indirect model for CRLs:
 - STI-PA manages the CRL
 - URL to CRL distributed in the issued certificates in the DistributionPointName field in the certificate
- Certification path validation per procedures defined in RFC 5280.
 - Additional step to verify that root CA is on the Trust List

Comparison to Enterprise PKI



Similarities

- Single entity (STI-PA) controls who can issue certificates
- CAs issue X.509 v3 certificates
- RFC 5280 certification path validation procedures followed

Differences

- STI-PA as the Trust Authority (Anchor) is not the root CA
- No single Root CA
- List of Trusted CAs provides PKI trust anchor for certificates
- Service Provider selects the CA from which to obtain certificate

Comparison to WebPKI



Similarities

- List of CAs similar to Trust Anchor Store
- User selects the CA from which to obtain certificates
- No single Root CA
- Hierarchy not imposed

Differences

- Establishes a clear, centralized governance structure with STI-GA and STI-PA
- STI-PA defines clear guidelines by which an STI-CA is added to the Trust List
- Defined procedures for providing Service Providers an updated Trust List
- STI-PA is the single entity authorized to remove an STI-CA from the Trust List
- Defined procedures for who is allowed to obtain certificates from an STI-CA

Benefits of SHAKEN PKI Model



A single STI-PA is deployed per country/region


- SHAKEN model defines STI-PA as a Trust Authority and NOT as a Root CA
- STI-CAs serve as Root CAs

Service Provider controls which STI-CA to use

- Service Providers can use CAs that meet their business and operational requirements
- STI-PA controls who can serve as an STI-CA and who can obtain certificates – BUT does not control the certificate issuance


Within each STI-CA, a hierarchical, single Root CA model can be established


- Each STI-CA can have an offline root CA with one or more intermediate CAs
- Aligns with model and practices used by existing CAs



- STI-PA maintains list of Trusted CAs
- Indirect CRL model supported :
 - STI-PA maintains CRL
 - URL is distributed in the certificates
- Local policy determines which STI-CA
 an SP uses for certificate acquisition
- Certificate is trusted due to trust in Root CA on the list of Trusted CAs







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Policy Administrator Implementation Status




- iconectiv announced as Policy Administrator for the SHAKEN ecosystem in May 2019: <u>https://authenticate.iconectiv.com/</u>
- PMA has produced a CP: <u>https://authenticate.iconectiv.com/documents-authenticate</u>
 - CAs are submitting CPSs, currently under review by PMA.
- PA system testing is wrapping up with Service Providers and CAs



PA functions: Roles & Responsibilities





PA functions: Administering CAs



- STI-GA provides PMA with policies associated with CA selection (Box 1)
- PMA develops Certificate Policy (Box 2)
- STI-CAs create an account with the STI-PA (portal)
- STI-CA provides CPS to PMA for review/approval (Box 2)
- The PMA director notifies PA admin when a CA has been approved (Box 3)
- The STI-CA's root certificate is added to the list of trusted STI-CAs (Box 3) (portal)
- SPs retrieves the STI-CA trust list from the STI-PA (Box 3) (HTTPS interface)
- SPs and CAs add revoked certificates to the CRL (Box 6) (Portal)

PA functions: Administration of SPs



- STI-GA has set the policy that OCNs are used as Service Provider Codes, SPs must have numbering resources and must have a Form 499A on file with the FCC (Box 1)*
- Prior to requesting a certificate, a Service Provider must:
 - Create an account with the STI-PA (Box 4) (portal)
 - Create an account with an STI-CA the fingerprint of the account credentials is input for the token generation**
 - Obtain a service provider code token from the STI-PA (Box 5) (API over HTTPS)
 - STI-PA provides the URL to the CRL in the SPC token request response (Box 5) (API over HTTPS)

<u>* https://www.atis.org/sti-ga/resources/docs/SPC%20Token%20Access%20Policy.pdf</u>


****** Not a PA function but a necessary step





STI-GA Role





STI-PA Selection

STI-GA appoints the STI-PA. The STI-PA operates a Policy Management Authority (PMA) that establishes the Certificate Policies for STI-CAs, incorporating policies as established by the STI-GA


Certificate Revocation



- Mechanism to support Certificate Revocation added to ATIS-1000080 Errata since not all SPs will support short-lived certificates
- Indirect CRL model is used:
 - STI-PA maintains the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) entries are in the form specified in RFC 5280
 - A URL to the CRL is included in the response to the request for an SPC token
 - SP includes URL to the CRL in the CSR when requesting certificate issuance in the DistributionPointName field
 - SPs and STI-CAs provide information on any certificates that have been revoked to the STI-PA using an out of band mechanism



Management and Distribution of Certificate Revocation List



ACME Overview



- ACME is a protocol developed in IETF for Automated Certificate Management (Environment).
- ACME defines an extensible framework for automating the issuance and validation procedures for certificates:
 - Allows servers to obtain certificates without manual user interaction
 - Based on a simple JSON over-HTTPS interface
- ACME protocol specifications:
 - Core protocol: RFC 8555
 - Authority Token Based Challenge/Response: <u>draft-ietf-acme-</u> <u>authority-token</u>
 - TNAuthlist (TNs and Service Provider codes) Authority Token Profile: <u>draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist</u>

ACME Protocol Model




- ACME uses HTTPS as a transport for Javascript Object Notation (JSON) Web Tokens (JWTs) in the form of JSON Web Signature (JWS) objects effectively a RESTful API:
 - ACME server runs at a Certification Authority (CA) and responds to client's actions if the client is authorized.
 - ACME client uses the protocol to request certificate management actions.
 - ACME client is represented by an "account key pair".
 - ACME client uses the private key to sign all messages to the server.
 - ACME server uses public key to verify the authenticity and integrity of messages from the client.



ACME Protocol Resource Objects





ACME Protocol SHAKEN Resource Objects









Certificate Object

Metadata Associated with Account

SHAKEN CSR includes TNAuthorizationList & DistributionPointName SHAKEN challenge: Authority Token Identifier of type "TNAuthList"

SHAKEN challenge Response includes Authority Token ("atc") which includes SPC Token In TNAuthlist

SHAKEN certificate includes "TNAuthorizationList" & "DistributionPointName"

• In the context of SHAKEN (ATIS-1000080), the TNAuthList contains only one Service Provider Code (SPC).

• DistributionPointName contains the URL to the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) received in response to SPC Token Request.

ACME Protocol Functions



- ACME uses different URLs (resources) for different management functions:
 - ≻New nonce
 - New Account
 - ≻New Order
 - New Authorization
 - Revoke Certificate
 - ≻Key change
- A single Directory URL is configured in client in order to get the Directory object containing the above URLs.



ACME Protocol Resource States




- Each resource object has a status field that reflects the state of the object and is used by the client and server to effect changes such as:
 - ACME server sets the status to "valid" in the Authorization object to indicate that the requestor of the certificate has been validated.
 - In the case of challenge/response, ACME client periodically polls (POST-as-GET) the Authorization object to determine if status is "valid"
 - ACME client sets the status to "deactivated" in the Account object to deactivate an account



ACME Directory Object





ACME - high level flow

• ACME high level request flow:

Get a nonce - HEAD newNonce

Create Account - POST newAccount

Submit order for a cert (order) - POST newOrder

Fetch challenges – POST-as-GET authz

Answer challenges – POST-as-GET challenge response

Poll for status – POST-as-GET order

Finalize order – POST order's finalize url

Poll for status – POST-as-GET order

Download certificate – POST-as-GET certificate URL



ACME - Order object



 ACME Order object represents a client's request for a certificate, and it's lifecycle through to issuance.

status (required, string) - status of the application. "pending", "ready", "processing", "valid", "invalid"

expires (optional, string) - timestamp of when the server will no longer consider the application valid

identifiers (required, array of object) – an array of identifier objects that the order pertains to: type (required, string), value (required, string)

notBefore (optional, string) - requested notBefore field in the certificate

notAfter (optional, string) - requested notAfter field in the certificate

error (optional, object) - error that occurred while processing order

authorizations (required, array or string) - requirements client needs to fulfill before granting certificate

finalize (required, string) - URL that a CSR must be POSTed to once all the authorizations have satisfied

certificate (optional, string) - URL for the issued certificate

ACME - Order example

```
POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
Host: sti-ca.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
 "protected": base64url({
 "alg": "ES256",
 "kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",
  "nonce": "5XJ1L3IEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
  "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/new-order"
 })
 "payload": base64url({
  "status": "pending",
   "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],
  "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z"
 }),
 "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
```



ACME - Authorization object



ACME authorization object represents a server's authorization for an account to represent an identifier.

status (required, string) - status of the authorization. "pending", "processing", "valid", "invalid", "revoked" - default value is "pending".

expires (optional, string) - if present, contains URI for an application resource, if absent, then CA MUST consider authorization valid for all applications

identifier (required, dictionary of string) - The identifier that the account is authorized to represent

- type (required, string) type of identifier
- value (required, string) identifier itself

challenges (required, array) - an array of challenges used for authorization

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ACME – Authorization Example

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Link: <https://sti-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"
```

```
"status": "pending",
"identifier": {
 "type": "TNAuthList",
 "value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="
},
"challenges": [
  "type": "tkauth-01",
  "tkauth-type": "ATC",
  "url": "https://sti-ca.com/authz/1234/0",
  "token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4NfDGDKfA"
```



SHAKEN Certificate Management Call Flow



STI-P Administ	SP-	KMS	STI-CA
		Apply for certificate - POST /acme/new-order	
		201 Created Create new application and authz obje	ect
Get Aut		Get Authz - GET /acme/authz/1234	
		200 OK Provide URL for auth challe	nge
		Check for fresh token, if expired request new token from STI-PA	
		Set token to respond to challenge - POST /acme/authz/1234/0	
		200 OK with updated challenge in body	
	Request public key to validate signature of	token is administrator signed - GET /sti-pa/cert.crt	
		20	00 OK
Validate token in challenge with admin cert, and set authz status to "valid" for success			ess
		Check that authz status is "valid" - POST /acme/authz/1234	
		200 OK - with valid then continue, if "pending", try authz until "valid"	
		Finalize order - POST /acme/order/asdf/finalize	
		200 OK - order update status is "processing"	
		Poll to for status to be "valid" - POST /acme/order/1234	
		200 OK - with "valid" status and link to final cert	
		Download the certificate - POST /acme/cert/mAt3xBGaobw	
		200 OK - with certificate in body	1

SHAKEN Certificate Acquisition Sequence of Events

